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The Absence of Legal Ethics in the






There is very little discussion of legal ethics in the American Law
Institute’s (“ALI”) recently adopted Principles of the Law of Aggre-
gate Litigation (“Principles”),1 in either the blackletter rules or the
comments.  To be sure, the Principles devote several sections in the
final chapter to the so-called aggregate settlement rule, i.e., Rule
1.8(g) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2  In one section,
and its accompanying comment, the Principles define an aggregate
settlement,3 thereby providing the helpful guidance to both lawyers
and courts that is otherwise missing from the Model Rule.4  In another
section, the Principles purport to “restate” Rule 1.8(g), including a
brief discussion of precisely what sort of information claimants are
entitled to receive when their common attorney negotiates and then
asks them to approve an aggregate settlement of their claims.5  Finally,
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  The
author is an ALI member and served on the Members’ Consultative Group for the ALI Princi-
ples of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.  As a professional responsibility teacher and scholar, my
interest in this project from the very beginning has been the ethical obligations of lawyers in-
volved in aggregate litigation.
1 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. (2010).
2 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2008).
3 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.16 & cmt. (2010).
4 See Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute’s Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggre-
gate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL
L. REV. 395, 396 (2008) (explaining the need for such a definition and the derivation of the
ALI’s proposed definition).
5 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17(a) (2010).  Elsewhere I criticized
an earlier but substantially similar version of this section because it did not address the level of
detail lawyers must provide.  Moore, supra note 4, at 396–97. Given that clients often want to
keep medical and financial information private, it is important to know to what extent their
desires can be respected under the current rule. Id.; see also Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against
Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 162–64
(1999) (arguing that the concern for privacy does not necessarily require changing the aggregate
settlement rule to permit clients to give advance consent to a settlement).
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in the section that undoubtedly drives the entire discussion, the Princi-
ples propose a modification of the Rule as it has been adopted and
interpreted in all U.S. jurisdictions,6 by providing that claimants can
agree in advance, under certain circumstances, to be bound by a ma-
jority vote in favor of a particular settlement.7
I have elsewhere written in opposition to an earlier version of the
ALI’s proposal to modify the aggregate settlement rule,8 and I am not
going to rehash that opposition in this Essay.9  What I want to do here
is to examine other parts of the Principles and comment on the impli-
cations of the dearth of any meaningful discussion of the ethical rules
that apply to lawyers involved in various types of aggregate litigation,
including both class actions and nonclass aggregations.10  I began this
investigation with the idea that the primary implication of the absence
of legal ethics in the Principles was that the ALI had missed an oppor-
tunity both to remind lawyers of their ethical obligations in these
types of proceedings11 and to propose solutions to some of the ethical
6 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 cmt. a (2010).
7 See id. § 3.17(b); see also id. § 3.17(c)–(f) (providing additional requirements for use of
an alternative to the traditional aggregate settlement rule); id. § 3.18 (providing for limited judi-
cial review of aggregate settlements reached pursuant to the alternative to the traditional aggre-
gate settlement rule).
8 See Moore, supra note 4. See generally Moore, supra note 5 (responding to the proposal
coauthored by Professor Charles Silver, one of the Reporters to the Principles).
9 In a nutshell, my opposition was based on the belief that the Reporters had not met
their burden to make a persuasive case for change.  Moore, supra note 4, at 400–01.  Specifically,
I argued that there is no empirical evidence that advance waivers are necessary to encourage
beneficial multiparty settlements. See, e.g., id. at 402–06.  Also, the proposal is a radical depar-
ture from the current law of lawyering, which provides numerous instances of “nonwaiveable
rights to void agreements likely to have been made on the basis of a lack of information, unequal
bargaining power, or coercion.” Id. at 401; see also id. at 416–20.  Based on this opposition, I
cosponsored a motion to delete sections 3.17(b) to 3.19 at the May 2008 meeting of the ALI. See
LARRY S. STEWART ET AL., AM. LAW INST., MOTION TO DELETE SECTIONS 3.17(B)–3.19 (2008),
http://www.ali.org/doc/Motion-AggLit-Stewart.pdf.  The motion was discussed at that meeting,
but no vote was taken, and the Reporters agreed to reconsider those sections. See AM. LAW
INST., ACTIONS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO DRAFTS SUBMITTED AT 2008 ANNUAL MEETING 17–18
(2008), http://www.ali.org/_meetings/6-18-08-ActionsTaken.pdf.
10 As an active participant in the Members’ Consultative Group, I share some responsibil-
ity for this omission.  Although I did inform the Reporters of at least some of these concerns at
the outset of the project and at various subsequent meetings, see, e.g., Letter from author to
Professors Samuel Issacharoff, Richard A. Nagareda & Charles Silver (May 24, 2005) (on file
with author), I could have pressed harder to identify ethical issues and propose specific lan-
guage.  I will say, however, that it was the general feeling among some of the members with a
background in ethics that the Reporters were not terribly interested in adding a discussion of
ethics to the Principles, even in the comments.
11 In the Introduction, the Principles state that “[t]he audience for this project includes
judges, legislators, other rule-makers (such as state bar associations and their advisory commit-
tees), researchers, and others with control of or interests in civil litigation.” PRINCIPLES OF THE
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issues that courts have yet to resolve, particularly in the area of class
actions.12  As I reread these other sections, however, I came to believe
that there is an even greater significance to the absence of any mean-
ingful discussion of legal ethics.  As set forth below, I argue that in the
class action context, the Principles appear to have inadvertently taken
an unexplained position on the controversial question of client identi-
fication in class actions.13  More important, the use of the unfortunate
term “structural conflict of interest”14 may seriously undermine the
otherwise laudable attempt to clarify judicial determinations of the
adequacy of legal representation.15  With respect to nonclass aggrega-
tions, I argue that the Principles’ failure to address ethical rules gov-
erning communication and conflicts of interest outside the context of
aggregate settlements makes it likely that mass tort lawyers will con-
tinue to treat their clients as if they were absent members of a class,
without the protections afforded a class.16
I. THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY:
CLASS ACTIONS AND NONCLASS AGGREGATIONS
Issues of legal ethics arise frequently in class action litigation, in-
cluding conflicts of interest, solicitation, communication, the reasona-
bleness of attorney’s fees, and the attorney-witness rule.17  Despite the
frequency with which these issues arise, current rules of professional
conduct do little to address the application of these rules in the con-
text of class actions specifically,18 and the ALI’s Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers similarly devotes little attention to
class action lawyers.19
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. intro., at 2 (2010).  Although this intended audience does not ex-
clude lawyers involved in aggregate litigation, it would appear that the Reporters did not view it
is an important part of the project to educate lawyers as to their obligations (ethical or other-
wise) when appearing in these types of proceedings.  I view this as unfortunate, and I know that
my views were shared among a number of ALI members who, like myself, have a background in
legal ethics.
12 See infra notes 17–30 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
14 E.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07(a)(1) (2010).
15 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
17 Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1477, 1477–78.
18 Id. at 1478–80.
19 The Restatement raises a number of issues in the context of class actions but rarely
proposes a solution.  For example, it notes that “[c]lass actions may pose difficult questions of
client identification,” but does not suggest whether it is the class itself or individual class mem-
bers who should be regarded as the class action lawyer’s client or clients. See RESTATEMENT
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In an earlier article, I defended the decision of the American Bar
Association’s Ethics 2000 Commission not to adopt either a separate
class action rule or extensive commentary addressing the application
of the rules to class action lawsuits.20  The first reason I gave was that
much of the confusion surrounding the application of rules of profes-
sional conduct in class actions could be significantly reduced, without
revising the ethics rules, if courts would adopt the view that the class is
an entity client of the class action lawyer, even at the precertification
stage of the litigation,21 and if courts would recognize that many so-
called “conflicts of interest” issues are the type of agency problems
that are not meant to be resolved under conflict of interest doctrine.22
The second reason I gave was that even if there are some situations in
which “relaxation (or special application)” of the rules may be neces-
sary in class actions, whether and when such rules are applied is a
question more properly decided under procedural class action rules—
primarily Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
caselaw applying that rule—rather than under rules of professional
conduct or by ethics committees and courts applying those rules.23  Fo-
cusing on the issue that has dominated much of the discussion of eth-
ics and class actions—the application of current conflict of interest
rules—I concluded that viewing the class as an entity client makes it
clear that conflicts within the class are not properly the subject of con-
flict of interest rules, such as Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Profes-
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (2000).  Similarly, with respect to pro-
ceedings requiring a special degree of candor toward the tribunal, the Restatement provides that
class counsel “has duties of care toward the class and may be taking a position that requires an
informed decision by the tribunal.  In such circumstances . . . the lawyer must disclose informa-
tion necessary for the tribunal to make an adequately informed decision.” Id. § 112 cmt. c (em-
phasis added).  For additional passing references to issues arising in class actions, see id. § 22
cmt. c (authorization of settlements); id. § 36 cmt. c (client responsibility to pay expenses); id.
§ 99 cmt. g (application of no-contact rule); id. § 125 cmt. f (defendant’s acquiescence in class
counsel’s proposed fee award); id. § 128 cmt. f (differences within class not creating ethical con-
flicts of interest).
20 See Moore, supra note 17, at 1480–81.
21 Id. at 1482–89.
22 Id. at 1489–92.  An example of an agency problem that is not addressed by the conflict
of interest doctrine is the “conflict between the client’s interest in having the lawyer devote the
most time possible to the client’s cause at the lowest possible price and the lawyer’s interest in
devoting the least possible time at the highest possible price.” Id. at 1490.  These types of inevi-
table agency problems “permeate legal and other professional practice” and are regulated by
relying on either lawyer professionalism or on other professional rules, such as those governing
competence, diligence, and legal fees. Id. at 1490–91.  Conflict of interest rules address conflicts
that are unique to particular lawyers and that can be avoided or removed by permitting or re-
quiring clients to find another lawyer. Id.
23 Id. at 1498–503.
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sional Conduct.24  Nevertheless, I also concluded that, when class
counsel is currently representing (or has formerly represented) indi-
viduals outside the class, such individuals are entitled to the full pro-
tection of professional conflict of interest rules.25  There may be
danger to the class as well; however, I urged that such danger be re-
solved not under rules of professional conduct, but rather as part of
the court’s determination of the adequacy of class counsel’s represen-
tation under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.26
These issues that I have previously addressed are some of the eth-
ical issues facing class action lawyers that the Reporters could have
addressed in the Principles—along with issues concerning communica-
tion,27 solicitation,28 and the attorney-witness rule29—but chose not to
in the rules themselves or even in the comments.  I view this as a
missed opportunity, both to alert class action lawyers to at least some
of the ethical problems they might encounter and to assist courts in
untangling the knots these problems present, such as when an individ-
ually represented client requests disqualification of class counsel be-
cause of an ethical conflict of interest.30
24 Id. at 1482–89.
25 Id. at 1492–98.
26 Id. at 1498–503.
27 See, e.g., ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§§ 15:5–15:20 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing communication with class members and potential class
members, including contacts by class counsel and opposing counsel). See generally Debra Lyn
Bassett, Pre-Certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 GA. L. REV. 353 (2002)
(same).
28 See, e.g., CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 27, § 15:04.
29 See, e.g., id. § 15:23.
30 In 2005, I testified as an expert on behalf of an individual member of a putative class
who testified that his law firm had told him that his case would be litigated individually and not
as part of a class.  When he learned that his law firm had negotiated a settlement of a class action
before a class action lawsuit was filed, although he had never been informed of these negotia-
tions, he moved to disqualify his law firm as class counsel because of a conflict of interest be-
tween himself and the putative class.  The motion was denied after a former federal judge, who
had been retained as an expert by the lawyers in question, testified to what he believed was
intended in a judicial opinion he himself had written concerning the relaxation of ethics rules
when a former class counsel appears on behalf of objectors to a proposed settlement.  He was
also permitted to testify as to conversations he had with another federal judge concerning the
interpretation of this and other similar cases. See Simon v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189
(DMC), 2006 WL 1541048, at *9–10 (D.N.J. June 2, 2006) (finally approving the settlement with
brief reference to an earlier denial of a motion to disqualify); Transcript of Proceedings, Simon,
2006 WL 1541048 (No. 05-CV-3189 (DMC)) (Oct. 28, 2005) (on file with author) (including
testimony of Hon. Arlin Adams); Transcript of Proceedings, Simon, 2006 WK 1541048 (No. 05-
CV-3189 (DMC)) (Oct. 31, 2005) (on file with author) (including testimony of Professor Nancy
J. Moore).
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Outside the class action context, aggregate litigation also raises a
myriad of ethical issues, including conflicts of interest,31 communica-
tion,32 solicitation,33 referrals,34 and attorney’s fees.35  Although some
of these issues are briefly mentioned in either the comments36 or the
Reporters’ Notes,37 they are not discussed in any meaningful way—
except with respect to the aggregate settlement rule38—and the refer-
ences are too fleeting to alert lawyers to the nature of the issues, the
applicable rules of professional conduct, or other resources that law-
yers might consult.39  Again, the failure to fully address these issues
can be viewed as a missed opportunity to give helpful guidance to
both lawyers and courts concerning ethics issues that commonly arise
in nonclass aggregations.
31 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 5, at 177–78 (discussing conflicts among multiple claimants
that begin as they agree to pursue collective action through common representation).
32 See id. at 160–62.
33 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2008).
34 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 535–38.
35 See generally Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions, Creating Sub-
sidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
2119 (2000) (advocating for stronger judicial regulation of attorney’s fees in aggregate litigation);
Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of Attorney
Fees and Costs in Mass Tort Litigation—A Response to Judith Resnik, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2209
(2000) (responding to Professor Resnik’s article).
36 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.05 cmt. c (2010) (“Speak-
ing generally . . . outside of representational lawsuits the law generally assumes that parties
always adequately represent themselves.  This assumption may be incorrect in non-class aggre-
gate lawsuits because of deficient incentives, conflicts of interest, or other reasons.”).  This is an
important statement; however, it appears in a paragraph addressing the due process requirement
of adequate representation in class actions.  Thus, it does not appear to be intended or likely to
alert nonclass lawyers to the conflicts of interest problem that is likely to arise when such lawyers
represent hundreds or thousands of clients with similar claims against a common defendant.
37 See, e.g., id. § 1.02 reporters’ note cmt. b(3) (“Cocounsel representations are subject to
professionalism rules that permit lawyers to share fees in proportion to the services rendered or
otherwise if all lawyers accept joint responsibility for the matter.  Usually, fee sharing is settled
by agreement when new attorneys are brought into a case.”); id. § 1.04 reporters’ note cmt. c
(“Agreements among litigants or between litigants and lawyers purporting to establish the objec-
tives of litigation may be governed by contract law, the law governing lawyers, agency law, or
other law.”).  Because lawyers are less likely to consult Reporters’ Notes, it would have been
preferable to put discussions such as these in the comments themselves.
38 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., supra notes 36–37.
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II. MORE THAN A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
A. Ethics and Class Actions
There are at least two ways in which I believe the ALI has done
more than simply miss an opportunity to highlight and address the
ethics of class action lawyers.  One is relatively minor.40  The other is
potentially more significant because it undermines the Reporters’
laudable effort to clarify the adequacy of representation requirement
under Rule 23 and bears directly on what I believe was the underlying
objective of the project—to advance the efficiency concerns of aggre-
gate litigation while simultaneously articulating the manner in which
the interests of individual claimants can be protected.41
First, instead of simply ignoring the fact that courts have not
clearly articulated the relationship of class counsel to the individual
members of the class, as well as the class itself,42 the Principles appear
to have inadvertently endorsed the view that all members of the class,
whether class representatives or absent class members, are individual
clients of the lawyer.  For example, section 1.04(a) states that “[a] law-
yer representing multiple claimants or respondents in an aggregate
proceeding should seek to advance the common objectives of those
claimants or respondents.”43  This section is clearly intended to ad-
dress both class and nonclass aggregations,44 and yet nothing in either
the comment or even the Reporters’ Notes addresses the confusion
that currently exists regarding the precise nature of the relationship
between class counsel and the individual members of a class, particu-
larly the absent class members.45  One of the consequences of identify-
ing class members as clients is that it suggests the need to relax
40 See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 17, at 1484–85.
43 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
44 The term “aggregate proceedings” is elsewhere defined to include not only class actions,
but also administrative aggregations and private aggregations, which are “informal collection[s]
of the claims or defenses of multiple parties, represented persons, claimants, or respondents
proceeding under common nonjudicial supervision or control.” Id. § 1.02.
45 In the Reporters’ Notes, the Reporters appear to take the view that class counsel re-
present named plaintiffs, who themselves owe a fiduciary duty to the unnamed members of the
class. Id. § 1.04 reporters’ note cmt. a (“Class counsel is thus a fiduciary to a client who is also a
fiduciary.”)  The Reporters do not note, however, the apparent contradiction between this state-
ment and the blackletter of section 1.04(a).  In addition, it may not be the case that class counsel
has a typical attorney-client relationship with each of the named plaintiffs, i.e., on the basis of an
individual retention agreement, particularly if the amount of their individual claims is so low that
the attorney would not be willing to represent them in an individual capacity. See, e.g., Moore,
supra note 17, at 1497.  I have been involved as an expert witness in a lawsuit by a class represen-
tative who sued class counsel in a consumer dispute for breach of fiduciary duty.  In that lawsuit,
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ethical-conflicts rules in order to permit class actions to proceed,
whereas viewing the class itself as an entity client makes it clear that
conflict of interest rules simply do not apply to intraclass conflicts.46
Second, and more important, the Principles create unnecessary
and potentially serious confusion by using the term “structural con-
flicts of interest,” particularly in section 2.07(a)(1), which addresses
one aspect of the traditional determination of the adequacy of repre-
sentation as a prerequisite to satisfying the requirements of constitu-
tional due process in binding absent members of the class.47  That
section is titled “Individual Rights in Aggregation of Related Claims,”
and subsection (a)(1) provides as follows:
(a) As necessary conditions to the aggregate treatment of
related claims by way of a class action, the court shall
(1) determine that there are no structural conflicts of
interest
(A) between the named parties or other claimants
and the lawyers who would represent claimants on
an aggregate basis, which may include deficiencies
specific to the lawyers seeking aggregate treatment
or
(B) among the claimants themselves that would pre-
sent a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants
might skew systematically the conduct of the litiga-
tion so as to favor some claimants over others on
grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their re-
spective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-
à-vis the lawyers themselves.48
The use of the term “structural conflicts of interest” is not ex-
plained in either the blackletter Rule or the Comment.49  The Report-
the class counsel claimed that the plaintiff was merely a named class representative, and not an
individual client, even prior to the time that any class action lawsuit was filed.
46 Moore, supra note 17, at 1482–89.
47 See id. at 1501 n.149 (discussing the adequacy of representation by class counsel under
both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution).
48 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
49 The Reporters did not originate this term.  Its first use in the class action context may
have been in a 1983 article by Professor John Coffee, in which he makes three arguments: (1) a
plaintiffs’ class counsel has a conflict of interest when the fee award is based on hours worked;
(2) defense counsel may take advantage of this conflict to tacitly agree with class counsel to
settle at a low amount in return for permitting class counsel to expend more time; and (3) this
collusion is “structural rather than conspiratorial” and results in inadequate settlements.  John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
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ers’ Notes, however, inform us that “[t]he casting of subsection (a)(1)
in terms of ‘structural conflicts of interest’ is designed to lend greater
precision to the loyalty inquiry in connection with class actions, an
inquiry historically phrased in terms of adequate representation.”50
The Notes go on to explain that “structural conflicts of interest” are
those that are “discernible as part of the determination to aggregate
or that emerge as part of that proceeding” and that “speak[ ] to the
legitimacy of the class judgment from its inception and irrespective of
its outcome.”51  In other words, the point is to separate those aspects
of adequacy that derive from “an improperly constituted class” from
those aspects that are “inextricably linked to outcome,” for example,
the adequacy of a class settlement.52
The term is unfortunate.  When these structural conflicts encom-
pass serious conflicts of interest among various groups within the
class—the type that requires subclassing in order to avoid the due pro-
cess problems encountered in decisions like Amchem53—the use of the
term is both obvious and helpful.  Moreover, conflicts among class
members are best viewed as completely outside the protection of the
profession’s conflict of interest rules.54  As a result, the failure to refer-
ence ethical conflict of interest doctrine creates no particular confu-
sion.  However, as used in section 2.07(a)(1), the Principles reference
not only these types of intraclass conflicts, but also other types of con-
flicts that are covered by traditional conflict of interest rules.  Exam-
ples include conflicts that arise when a lawyer currently represents
individuals outside the class with claims that are similar to those of the
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 247–48 (1983).  The term’s notoriety, however, was
almost certainly the result of its use by the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20, 627 (1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856–57 & n.31
(1999) (citing Amchem).  In those two cases, the Supreme Court appeared to be using the term
to refer to conflicts within the class itself.  The term was also featured prominently in a more
recent article by Professor Coffee. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Recon-
ciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 386 (2000)
(discussing “structural conflicts in the mass tort class action” in the following groups: “(1) inter-
nal conflicts that exist within the class . . . ; (2) external conflicts that arise because class members
(or their attorneys) have some extraneous reason for favoring a settlement that does not truly
benefit the interests of all class members; (3) risk conflicts that arise because class members or
class counsel have very different attitudes about the level of risk they are willing to bear; and
(4) conflicts over control of the litigation”).  The use of the term in all of these different contexts
is no more helpful than its use by the Reporters in this project, except perhaps when the Su-
preme Court uses it to reference conflicts within the class that require subclassing.
50 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07 reporters’ notes cmt. d (2010).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 626 & n.20.
54 Moore, supra note 17, at 1487–89.
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class and conflicts that arise when a lawyer has previously represented
a defendant in a substantially related matter.55  Section 2.07(a)(1) also
encompasses conflicts between members of the class who have indi-
vidual retainer agreements with the lawyer and those who do not.56
It should be the case that when these types of conflicts arise, cli-
ents outside the class are entitled to the full protection of the rules of
professional conduct, including disqualification of class counsel when
necessary to protect the interests of the nonclass clients.57  But what
about the interests of the class itself?  Section 2.07(a)(1) suggests that
if there is “a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew
systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some claim-
ants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their
respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the law-
yers themselves,”58 then aggregate treatment by way of a class action
is inappropriate.  In other words, a precondition to such aggregate
treatment by way of a class action is a determination that “there are
no structural conflicts of interest.”59  Here, the use of the term “struc-
tural conflict of interest” is confusing because the analysis appears to
differ in important respects from the treatment of such conflicts under
traditional conflict of interest rules.
Under Model Rule 1.7, a potentially impermissible conflict of in-
terest exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibili-
ties to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.”60  However, the mere existence of such a con-
flict does not necessarily render the representation unethical.  Rather,
if the conflict is consentable, then the lawyer may proceed with the
55 See id. at 1492–98 (urging straightforward application of the conflict of interest rules in
order to protect the interests of the nonclass current or former client).
56 See id. at 1493.  For example, individual retainer agreements may give the lawyer a legal
fee that is a larger percentage of the amount received by a claimant than the lawyer would
receive as a fee award from the court. Id. at 1499 & n.134.  That would give the lawyer an
incentive to favor the lawyer’s own clients in any settlement agreement. Id. at 1499; see also, e.g.,
Moore, supra note 4, at 409 n.83 (describing a recent case involving allegations to this effect in a
nonclass aggregate settlement in which plaintiffs’ counsel allegedly had an incentive to favor
directly retained clients, as opposed to referred clients, because of differences in the amount of
legal fees the counsel would earn upon settlement).
57 Moore, supra note 17, at 1492–98.
58 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07(a)(1) (2010).
59 Id. (emphasis added); see id. § 2.07 cmt. d.
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2008).
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representation after obtaining the informed consent of each affected
client.61
A conflict is typically consentable if “the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client.”62  Intraclass conflicts that pose
significant risks may be cured by the use of subclassing, in which case
the conflict no longer exists and does not need client consent.  But
subclassing is not an option for the other types of conflicts encom-
passed by section 2.07(a)(1), i.e., conflicts between the class itself and
individually represented clients, either within or outside of the class.
Perhaps the Principles intend to convey that, in all such conflicts, cli-
ents cannot consent and, therefore, a lawyer with such a conflict may
not represent the class, but I doubt this is the case.  After all, “it is not
necessarily desirable to create a per se ethical prohibition on the si-
multaneous representation of both a class and individuals with inter-
ests potentially at odds with those of the class” as a whole.63  This is
particularly so when the lawyer represents some but not all of the in-
dividual members of the class, including some of the absent class
members, because the risks to the class may be small in relation to the
potential benefits of pursuing the action with a lawyer who is already
familiar with the underlying subject matter by virtue of the lawyer’s
ongoing representation of individual class members.64
When the potential advantages of joint representation outweigh
the potential risks, a conflict of interest is typically consentable.  But
who gives informed consent on behalf of a class?  Perhaps the court
does so (or could do so) as part of its adequacy of representation de-
termination,65 and perhaps this is the type of determination that the
Principles mean to propose in section 2.07(a)(1).  But if this is the
case, then the Principles do not clearly communicate that, in applying
this section, courts should determine not only whether a “structural
conflict” of this sort exists, but also whether the particular conflict is
sufficiently severe that aggregation cannot proceed unless a lawyer
61 Id. R. 1.7(b); see also id. R. 1.7 cmt. 2 (“Resolution of a conflict of interest problem
under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine
whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken
despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult
with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in
writing.”).
62 Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
63 Moore, supra note 17, at 1500.
64 Id. at 1500–01.
65 See id. at 1501 (noting that this would not be sufficient with respect to prefiling conflicts,
as when a lawyer negotiates a settlement class action).
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without a conflict of interest is substituted as class counsel.  Or per-
haps the Principles intend to suggest that, by definition, a “structural
conflict” does not exist unless the particular conflict is of that level of
severity such that any potential advantages of representation by this
lawyer are clearly outweighed by the risks.  But again, if this is the
case, then the Principles do not clearly communicate the type of anal-
ysis contemplated.
In my view, clarification of the proposed analysis necessarily re-
quires an explanation of the relationship between the structural-con-
flicts analysis contemplated under section 2.07(a)(1) and the analysis
more typically conducted under rules of professional conduct, keeping
in mind that under Rule 1.7, conflicts are very broadly defined, with
the understanding that most conflicts can be waived by the affected
clients.  Given the inability to obtain the informed consent of the class
to the risks of conflicted representation, section 2.07(a)(1) conflicts
should probably be much more narrowly defined than Rule 1.7 con-
flicts.  In any event, the failure to address the relationship between
section 2.07(a)(1) and Rule 1.7 undermines the ALI’s objective of
clearly articulating how the individual interests of individual claimants
should and will be protected in aggregate proceedings, including class
actions.
B. More than a Missed Opportunity: Ethics and
Nonclass Aggregations
As for nonclass aggregations, I am principally concerned with
what the Principles describe as “private aggregation”66 or “informal
aggregation,”67 particularly situations in which “[m]ass-solicitation ef-
forts, referral networks, and specialization may concentrate large
numbers of clients with related claims in the hands of a few attorneys
or even a single firm.”68  Here, I believe that the Principles offer a
view of mass representation that is unduly rosy.  They not only ignore
the application of ethics rules to various aspects of nonclass aggrega-
tions, but also affirmatively downplay the risks of such representation
and the role that ethics rules play in protecting the individual clients
against such risks.  These protections become especially important
once it is recognized that mass tort lawyers often treat their clients as
66 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.02(c) (2010).
67 Id. § 1.02 cmt. b(3).
68 Id.
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if they were members of a class without affording them the judicial
protections given to actual class members.69
Throughout the document, the Principles consistently tout the
benefits of individual clients forming “consensual group lawsuits”70
and other “litigation groups”71 (e.g., clients with similar claims who
have not yet filed a lawsuit), with no significant discussion of any of
the accompanying risks.  For example, referral networks are described
as entirely beneficial because the referral market corrects the mis-
match of clients and lawyers that results in deficient representation.72
There is no mention of the risks entailed in such referral markets.  For
example, some lawyers may refer cases to another lawyer because that
lawyer offers a more favorable referral fee or because that lawyer’s
own marketing efforts have misled the referring lawyer to believe that
he has more experience and expertise than is in fact the case.73  There
is also no mention of the likely violation of rules that prohibit lawyers
from false or misleading advertising when they market themselves to
the public without any indication that their intention is to turn these
cases over to other lawyers in return for a referral fee.74
69 See generally, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Ag-
gregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157 (2004) (proposing
conferring judicial authority to oversee and authorize mass tort settlements outside the class
action context).
70 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04 cmt. c (2010).
71 See, e.g., id. § 1.02 reporters’ note cmt. b(3) (“[I]ndividuals often have (and may even
prefer to have) their day in court as part of litigation groups.”).
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 34, at 536–39.  Although it may be true that “it is reasona-
ble to expect that the incentives of the referral market would generally channel referral cases to
lawyers competent to handle them and positioned to take advantage of economies of scale and
opportunities for bargaining leverage,” id. at 537–38 (emphasis added), there are numerous op-
portunities for the referral market to fail, including the inability or lack of willingness of refer-
ring lawyers to discern precisely which other lawyers are best positioned to advance the clients’
interests in maximizing recovery, see id. at 537 (discussing criticisms of what some plaintiffs’
lawyers “see as excessive and unethical advertising and referral practices among their col-
leagues”).  These failures may be exacerbated by the referring lawyers’ failures to recognize
conflicts of interests among the individual clients they are referring. See infra notes 89–94 and
accompanying text.
74 I have seen numerous television advertisements directed at potential mass tort claim-
ants, but I have never seen a single advertisement stating that the lawyer or law firm plans to
refer claimants to other lawyers who will actually handle their cases.  The failure to disclose such
an intention makes an advertisement false or misleading and therefore unethical. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading com-
munication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.  A communication is false or misleading if
it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.”).
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Similarly, the Principles note that “private aggregation helps level
the playing field” by making it possible for individual clients to reduce
costs by working collectively and presenting a united front,75 but there
is no significant mention of the risks of aggregation through joint rep-
resentation, including conflicts of interest among the clients as a result
of varying degrees of injury or different statutes of limitations.76  To be
sure, the Principles acknowledge the potential for conflict at the stage
when the lawyer proposes an aggregate settlement of the clients’
claims.77  But what about the initial decision to aggregate?  By the
time that an aggregate settlement is proposed, it may be too late for
individual clients to protect themselves against the risks of
aggregation.78
Outside of aggregate settlements, the Principles appear to assume
that nonclass claimants do not need protection because, unlike absent
class members, these claimants are in a position to protect themselves.
For example, under section 1.04, “a lawyer representing multiple
claimants . . . should seek to advance the common objectives of those
claimants,”79 and, unless otherwise agreed, the primary common ob-
jective is assumed to be “maximizing the net value of the groups of
claims.”80  Once that net value has been maximized, the common
objectives are also assumed to include “compensating each claimant
appropriately”;81 however, the comment acknowledges that “[r]ough
justice” or “damages averaging” is normal in aggregate proceedings.82
Significantly, the comment further provides that “[t]he possibility of
altering the objectives to be pursued exists mainly in consensual group
75 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.02 reporters’ note cmt. b(3) (2010).
76 As noted earlier, there is a statement in a subsequent comment acknowledging that
parties might not always adequately represent themselves in nonclass aggregations “because of
deficient incentives, conflicts of interests, or other reasons.” See supra note 36.  That statement,
however, appears in a paragraph discussing the due process requirements of adequate represen-
tation in class actions, id., and hardly serves as a meaningful warning of the risks of aggregation
at the outset of the representation of multiple nonclass claimants, i.e., outside the context of
aggregate settlements, which arise at a much later time.
77 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.16 cmt. a (2010).
78 Most important, the client may not have the benefit of the attorney’s independent pro-
fessional judgment as to whether the client should accept or reject the settlement offer.  Both the
attorney and the other clients will have a significant financial interest in securing the client’s
approval of the settlement if, as is typical, the settlement will not be effective as to any of the
claimants unless all or a substantial majority of them approve it. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 4,
at 406–09.
79 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04(a) (2010).
80 Id. § 1.04(b)(1).  Although the Principles do not say so explicitly, I assume that the
objectives listed in section (b) are placed in rank order of assumed importance.
81 Id. § 1.04(b)(2).
82 Id. § 1.04 cmt. f.
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lawsuits and other proceedings where participants who enjoy high
levels of control can meet face to face.”83  But surely this does not
accurately describe the situation in which a single lawyer represents
thousands of individual clients from all parts of the country and such
face-to-face meetings will be next to impossible.  And even if the cli-
ents could meet, what exactly could they do to alter the objectives if
they cannot agree on an alternative?  What sort of agreement could
they reach that would ensure, at the outset, that appropriate compen-
sation will avoid “rough justice” or “damages averaging”?
The problem, of course, is that the Principles assume that in “con-
sensual group lawsuits,” the individual clients have chosen to proceed
as part of a “litigation group,” thereby consenting to a certain loss of
control over their individual cases.  But what ensures that the clients
have been adequately informed of both the advantages and the risks
of proceeding as part of a “litigation group”?  What ensures that the
decisions are truly consensual?  What the Principles ignore is that,
without the protections afforded to class members, individual nonclass
clients have only the rules of professional conduct to protect them
against the potential harms of the “class-action-style procedures [that]
have come to be employed in mass-tort lawsuits where class actions
could not ordinarily be certified.”84
Under rules of professional conduct, individual clients must be
fully informed, at the outset of the representation, of any significant
risk that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s
duty to other clients.85  With that information, individual clients might
decide that they want to become part of a litigation group represented
by this particular lawyer.  But some clients might refuse, or they might
decide that they prefer to be represented by a lawyer who represents a
more narrowly tailored group, such as individuals with very severe in-
juries or without serious statute of limitations problems.  Indeed,
under rules of professional conduct, it might be the case that some
conflicts among individual clients cannot be waived by consent.86  For
example, if a lawyer attempts to combine in a single litigation group
clients with the type of structural conflicts that would require subclas-
sing if the clients were members of a class,87 then the fact that there
would likely be no judicial approval of any future settlement may lead
83 Id. § 1.04 cmt. c.
84 Id. § 1.05 cmt. b.
85 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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to the inescapable conclusion that adequate representation requires
that these groups be represented by different lawyers.88
Even when the conflicts are consentable, the risk remains that the
lawyer will favor the interests of some clients over other clients, or
that the lawyer will favor his or her own interests by settling cases too
quickly.89  Because no judge will determine the fairness of any pro-
posed settlement, it is up to the clients themselves to monitor the law-
yer’s conduct.  In order to do so, however, the client may need access
to more information than class counsel typically provides to absent
class members.  Unfortunately, the Principles do not distinguish be-
tween class and nonclass counsel with respect to the lawyer’s duty to
communicate.  For example, the Comment to section 1.05 provides
that lawyers should communicate with their nonclass clients with re-
spect to important decisions, such as the need to select the best test
case for bellwether trials.90  What the Principles ignore, however, is
that rules of professional conduct actually require that lawyers reason-
ably communicate with their clients, not only to enable them to make
important decisions, but also to “keep [clients] reasonably informed
about the status of the matter” and to “promptly comply with reason-
able requests for information.”91  Similarly, although the Comment
notes with approval the use of electronic communications for all forms
of aggregate proceedings, it simultaneously approves the decision of
many lawyers to reserve the use of more expensive telephone banks
for “major decisions, mainly settlement”92 on the ground that other-
wise communication “is simply a burden.”93  Nowhere do the Princi-
88 When subclassing is required in a class action, it is typically the case that each subclass
must be represented by separate counsel. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 &
n.31 (1999) (“In Amchem, we concentrated on the adequacy of named plaintiffs, but we recog-
nized that the adequacy of representation enquiry is also concerned with the ‘competency and
conflicts of class counsel.’”).
89 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 4, at 406–09.
90 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.05 cmt. f (2010).  Bellwether trials
are sample cases tried for the purpose of either voluntarily binding other claimants or providing
guidance to the court and others. See id. § 2.02 cmt. b. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav,
Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008).
91 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2008).
92 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.05 cmt. i (2010).
93 Id. § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. i (“Communication should be encouraged when it is
likely to enable recipients to make informed decisions and when it is likely to generate informed
responses.  Otherwise, communication is simply a burden.  In aggregate proceedings involving
large numbers of persons, lawyers should be encouraged to use low-cost methods of communi-
cating routine information.  Expensive methods should be employed only when fundamental
matters are at hand, such as communications about settlement or required discovery
responses.”).
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ples distinguish between the level and type of communication required
of lawyers representing individual clients and that required of class
counsel.94
CONCLUSION
Aside from a proposal to modify the aggregate settlement rule,
the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation barely mention the
wide-ranging ethical issues that arise in both class actions and nonclass
aggregate litigation.  From my point of view, this is highly regrettable.
First, the ALI has missed an important opportunity both to educate
lawyers regarding their ethical obligations in these types of proceed-
ings and to propose solutions to some unresolved issues, such as the
identity of class counsel’s client and the applicability of ethical conflict
of interest rules to class actions.  Second, and more important, the
ALI’s failure to integrate ethics and procedure may actually under-
mine the underlying objective of the project, which was to advance
efficiency while simultaneously articulating how the interests of indi-
vidual claimants can be protected.  In the class action context, the
Principles propose a treatment of “structural conflicts” that is confus-
ing and misleading precisely because it fails to explain the difference
between structural conflicts and ethical conflicts.  In the context of
nonclass aggregations, the absence of ethics creates the false impres-
sion that the primary point at which ethical issues arise is the negotia-
tion of an aggregate settlement, although there are numerous ethical
issues that are commonly present from the very outset of any aggrega-
tion of individual claims, including both conflicts of interest and com-
munication.  The failure to address these issues contributes to the
unfortunate tendency of mass tort lawyers to treat their individual cli-
ents as if they were absent members of a class, thereby ignoring the
reality that the most significant protections afforded to nonaggregate
claimants are the rules of professional conduct.
94 Elsewhere, in addressing the cost of regularly communicating with nonclass clients, I
concluded that, “[g]iven the enormous fees that many of these cases generate, I doubt that law-
yers who are required to spend additional money on communication expenses will abandon the
field of mass tort litigation.”  Moore, supra note 5, at 162 (citation omitted).
